Dilution and Anti-Dilution: A Reply to
Professor Kaplan
David L. Ratner

Professor Stanley Kaplan, in the Autumn issue of the Review, has
pointed out that the "anti-dilution" provisions of convertible securities
should not be considered as "boilerplate" to be copied from the handiest available precedent. 1 Any presentation which helps to clarify the
basic problems and the relevant choices in this arcane subject is welcome. However, Professor Kaplan's discussion of the respective merits
of the "conversion price" formula and the "market price" formula 2
seems to me to involve some dubious assumptions and may mislead
lawyers into believing that the conversion price formula, despite its
greater complexity and its lack of logical basis of support, is always
of greater benefit to the holder of the convertible security than is the
market price formula.
The principal affirmative arguments that Professor Kaplan advances
for the conversion price formula are that it is "traditional" and that
it produces a "windfall" for the holder of a convertible security whenever the market for the underlying security has declined below the
conversion price and the corporation issues an additional amount of
the underlying security at the current market price.3 The only hint
of a theoretical underpinning for the conversion price formula is
provided, ironically, in a quote from an adherent of the market price
formula, who asserts that the conversion price formula "is designed
to preserve the intrinsic value of the conversion privilege as it existed
at the time of the issuance of the convertible security, determined on
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1 Kaplan, Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in Convertible
Securities, 33 U. CM. L. REV. 1 (1965).
2 Briefly, the conversion price formula provides for adjustments in the conversion
price when additional shares of the underlying security are sold at a price below the
conversion price; the market price formula provides for adjustments when additional
shares are sold to shareholders at a price below their current market value. For a fuller
description, see Kaplan, supra note 1, at 4-10.
3 Id. at 24.
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the assumption that the underlying security had at that time a potential value at least equal to the original conversion price." 4
Be that as it may, Professor Kaplan finds a number of "problems"
in the operation of the market price formula so significant that he
suggests that "a convertible security which contains a traditional conversion price clause should be of greater value to the convertible security holder and should accordingly sell at a higher price than a comparable convertible security containing a market price clause." 5 What
are these "problems"?
First, "it may be argued that the holder of convertible securities is
more likely to have a short-run concept of his investment than is the
common stockholder; hence it may not be sufficient or appropriate to
regard him as a common stockholder or to put him in a position where
his interest can be diluted merely because of a price change in the
stock market."6
I am not at all clear what the relevance of the "short-run concept"
is. Presumably the convertible security holder has the same interest
as the common stockholder in seeing the common stock rise in value
and will not automatically convert his security into common stock as
soon as the market price of the latter rises above the conversion price.y
But more important, I cannot see how the "interest" of the convertible
security holder is "diluted" in any ordinary sense of the word when
a corporation issues shares of common stock at the current market
price but below the conversion price. Assume that a corporation has
two series of convertible securities outstanding. Series A is convertible
into common stock at a price of $10 a share; Series B is convertible
into common stock at a price of $6 a share. The holders of each series
have an "interest" in every fluctuation in the market price of the
common stock. The corporation sells 10,000 shares of common stock
at $8 a share, which is the current market price. Under the conversion
price formula, the "interest" of the holders of Series A has been
"diluted," while the "interest" of the holders of Series B has not. Yet
there is no possibility that the holders of Series A can suffer any disadvantage as a result of the issuance of shares at $8 which will not fall
equally on the holders of Series B. In fact, the opposite is true. If the
4 Id. at 10 n.21. I do not know what that means. But see note 19 infra.

5 Id. at 27.
6 Id. at 22-23.
7 Professor Buxbaum considers the market price formula "an admission that the theoretical bases for the existence of convertible securities are false," since it recognizes that
the holders of a convertible security will retain it even though the market price of the
underlying security has risen above the conversion price. Buxbaum, Preferred StockLaw and Draftsmanship,42 CALF. L. Riv. 243, 284 (1954).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[V'ol. 33:494

issuance of shares at $8 causes the market price of the common stock
to remain at $8 instead of going to $9, the holders of Series B will be
hurt, but the holders of Series A will be unaffected, since they have
no "interest" in fluctuations in the market price of the common stock
if the market price of the common stock would never have reached
the conversion price in any event. I find it hard to conclude that an
adjustment of the conversion price of the $10 issue is anything but a
"windfall," as Professor Kaplan subsequently recognizes.,
In a sense, every issue of additional common stock "dilutes" the
interests of present and potential stockholders by increasing the number of shares over which the total voting power and the total equity
interest are spread. 9 Thus, if a convertible security holder can convert
his security into a number of shares which will represent a majority
of the outstanding shares and if acquisition of a majority of the shares
is important to him, any issuance of additional shares at any price
will "dilute" his interest in a meaningful way, and the "anti-dilution"
provisions of his security should either prohibit the issuance of additional shares or provide for a pro rata adjustment of the conversion
ratio whenever the corporation issues any shares. However, the only
"interest" of the convertible security holders with whom Professor
Kaplan is concerned is in the economic or market value of the underlying securities. Their "interest" is "diluted" only when the. corporation takes some action which causes a portion of the value that
would otherwise have accrued to the shares issuable on conversion of
the convertible securities to be diverted to other securities or security
holders, which in turn results in the underlying securities not reaching
as high a value as they would have reached if such action had not
been taken. If a corporation sells common stock to the public, or to
its stockholders, at $8 a share when the market price is $8 a share,
there is no dilution of the interests of convertible security holders,
whether their conversion price is $6, or $10, or any other figure.10
The corporation may be ill-advised in selling stock at a time when
the market is low, but it is not the function of anti-dilution provisions
8 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 24.
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 622, giving shareholders the preemptive right to

subscribe to additional shares the issuance of which would "adversely affect" their "unlimited dividend rights" or "voting rights." See also Berle, Corporate Devices for Diluting
Stock Participations,31 COLUM. L. Rav. 1239 (1931).
10 "Dilution" has been defined as "an increase in the number of shares without a
corresponding increase in assets and earning power." GRAHAM, DODD & Coma, ScuRrry
ANALYsxs 615 (4th ed. 1962). But when does the number of shares "correspond" with
the consideration received for their issuance? If the shares are publicly traded, is it not
when the consideration is equal to the price that would be paid on a sale of already
outstanding shares, i.e., the market price?
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to protect convertible security holders against the possible bad judgment of the corporation's directors in timing its security issues, any
more than to protect against bad judgment in production, or sales,
or any other aspect of the management of the business.
The second "problem" that Professor Kaplan finds in the market
price formula is the uncertainty "that the holder of convertible securities will be in a position to institute a suit to enjoin . . . misconduct
. . . of the kind which this clause leaves to be guarded by the restraints

of general corporate law."'"
I, however, do not see that there is any essential difference between
the market price and conversion price formulas in this area. As Professor Kaplan himself notes, "none of the types of anti-dilution clauses,
whether constructed on the conversion price or the market value formula, is impervious to evasion."'12 Whichever formula is used, additional provisions may be added to cover unusual transactions not
fitting within the basic anti-dilution provisions. Perhaps Professor
Kaplan was thinking of the possibility that the corporation would issue
common stock to persons other than stockholders below the current
market price, which an exponent of the market price formula suggested to him as a contingency which might be "left to the protection
of basic corporate law or to good faith valuations by the board of
directors."' 13 But the conversion price formula which Professor Kaplan
espouses offers extra protection to the convertible security holder in
this situation only if the underlying security is sold at a price below
the conversion price as well as below the market price. For example,
if the conversion price is $10, the current market price of the underlying security $25, and the corporation sells a substantial block of the
underlying security at $12, the holder of the convertible security with
a conversion price formula not only gets no adjustment under his antidilution provisions; he also has arguably abandoned any right to question the fairness of the transaction. By pegging his right to an adjustment to the arbitrary and irrelevant factor of the conversion price,
regardless of intent, he could well be said to have conceded a lack of
"interest" in any sales above the conversion price.
In any event, I cannot see why Professor Kaplan is so concerned
with the convertible security holder's right to enjoin the transaction.
The security holder's interest is in his contractual right to acquire
a certain amount of the underlying security in exchange for his present
security; there should be no question of the corporation's right to turn
11

Kaplan, supra note 1, at 23.

12 Id.

at 17.

13 Id. at 21-22 n.31.
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its capital structure upside down and inside out, if it so desires, as
long as the appropriate adjustments are made in the conversion price.
Third is "the difficult problem of proving a deviation from market
price in sales to common shareholders."' 4 But, as Professor Kaplan
notes three pages later, this problem is generally taken care of by
defining the term "market price" in the formula, with alternative
provisions depending on whether the underlying security is traded
on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter market at the time the
offering to shareholders is made. 15 I will readily concede that a market
price formula will not work for a corporation whose securities are not
publicly traded. But the common shareholders of a publicly-held corporation know perfectly well when shares are being offered to them
below market price, and there is no special difficulty in showing
whether there is a discount and approximately how large it is.
The fourth "problem" is that "the market price clause deprives the
convertible security holder of some windfalls . . .which have been
built into the traditional conversion price clauses" and that there are
"questions of propriety and fairness" as to "whether such implicit
understandings should be lightly abandoned without fanfare or public
notice."' 16 My understanding of this passage is that Professor Kaplan
concedes that the conversion price formula is, in certain circumstances,
unduly generous to the holders of the convertible security at the expense of the holders of the underlying security, but that he would be
ready to abandon it only after a flourish of trumpets signifying the
end of the era of injustice. If that is the case, let the trumpets sound
(and, for good measure, let us adopt Professor Kaplan's suggestion that
prospectuses for public issues of convertible securities should describe
the basic anti-dilution provisions17).
But I am not really convinced that the fanfare is necessary, since
the conversion price formula may be more notable for its pitfalls than
its windfalls. As an example of a device available to an unscrupulous
board of directors to defeat the protection of the market price formula,
Professor Kaplan hypothesizes that the directors of a corporation, having sold securities convertible into common stock at $10, wish to sell
additional shares of common stock to the shareholders while the market price is $10. Their first step is to cut the dividend in half, which
causes the market price to drop to $8. They then offer additional stock
to the shareholders at "the new market price of $8" and, for reasons
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.

at
at
at
at

23.
26.

24.
27 n.37.
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known only to Professor Kaplan, the shareholders buy it. The directors then restore the dividend, the market price rebounds to $10, and
8
"the outcome of this series of events is an actual dilution."'
Let me suggest instead the following counter-example, which reflects
to a greater extent not only corporate reality but also the long-term
inflation in security prices which is an important factor in the current
popularity of convertible securities. A corporation has sold securities
convertible into common stock at $10 a share. The market price of
the common stock is now $25 a share. The corporation wishes to raise
an additional $2,000,000 by offering additional shares to its present
shareholders. It can raise the money by offering 80,000 shares at $25,
100,000 shares at $20, or 200,000 shares at $10. The first alternative
is unrealistic; the shareholders are unlikely to subscribe unless the
offering is made at a substantial discount from market price. The
second involves some dilution, but a reasonable amount designed to
assure a successful offering. The third alternative involves substantial
dilution, the purpose of which can only be to worsen the position of
the convertible security holders vis-ht-vis the present common stockholders. The market price formula would provide for adjustment of
the conversion price in either the second or third situation, with the
amount of adjustment proportional to the amount of the dilution.
The conversion price formula would not provide any adjustment in
either situation, 19 and the only way the holders of the convertible security could protect themselves from dilution would be to convert their
20
security into common stock before the record date for the offering.
18 Id. at 25. While this might be thought to be an unduly imaginative hypothetical
example, it compares favorably in realism with the alternative suggestion that the directors might seek to benefit the common shareholders at the expense of the convertible
security holders by offering additional shares to the common shareholders "at the new
low prices" prevailing "during a market decline following such an event as President
Eisenhower's heart attack or President Kennedy's assassination." Id. at 26.
19 A similar example has been cited as illustrating that the effect of the conversion
price formula "is to preserve only the principal or par value of the [convertible security]
. .. against dilution. If a convertible is selling considerably above par, the premium will
still be subject to impairment through additional stock issues or a special dividend."
GRAHA, DODD & CoTrr, supra note 10, at 615-16. (Emphasis in original.) This statement
indicates a misconception about the purpose of convertibility which is perhaps partly
responsible for the prevalence of the conversion price formula. If a convertible security
has a principal or par value of $1,000, the purpose of making it convertible into common
stock, which fluctuates in value, is to make it possible for the convertible security holder
to recognize more than $1,000 on disposition of his security; his right to receive at least
$1,000 is protected by other preferential provisions in the indenture or certificate under
which the convertible security was issued. In other words, the "premium" is the only
thing with which the conversion provisions are concerned.
20 Of course it can be argued that if the market price is above the conversion price,
the only protection the convertible security holder needs is sufficient notice to enable
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Even if the convertible security holders could show that the directors
had chosen the third alternative solely to worsen their position, they
would have no complaint. The same principle and enabling language
which give the right to an adjustment upon any sale below the conversion price, regardless of motive or the existence of any "dilution"
in the real sense, operate in the same way to deny an adjustment for
any sale above the conversion price, regardless of motive or the existence of any real "dilution."
Professor Kaplan refers to the kind of situation described in the
last paragraph as "one rare circumstance under which the market price
clause will produce benefits for holders of the convertible securities
which would not be obtainable under the standard conversion price
clause." 21 Given a period of steadily rising security prices, I wonder
how rare it is. Like Professor Kaplan, I have no statistics to show in
how many of the convertible securities issued in recent years the market price formula would have produced more favorable adjustments
for the holders of the security, and in how many the conversion
price formula would have produced the more favorable results. However, I am not sure that this lack of statistical evidence is a real handicap to the lawyer who must choose, or provide a sufficient explanation
to enable his client to choose, on a pragmatic basis, either the market
or conversion price formula in a particular case. If the best guess of
the security buyer is that the underlying security may rise substantially
in value and that the corporation may obtain additional financing by
rights offerings to its shareholders, the market price formula is more
likely to result in adjustments. On the other hand, if the past record
indicates that the common stock will fluctuate below, as well as above,
the conversion price and that the corporation, for some reason, is
likely to sell additional shares to the public or to its stockholders when
him to convert before the record date, and that the market price formula in this situation "gives the [convertible security holder] . . .more than he bargained for, since it
protects as an investment the speculative gain accrued to this time." Buxbaum, supra
note 7, at 284. (Emphasis in original.) In fact, if a convertible security is redeemable,
as they usually are, it could even be said that any corporate action which would result
in dilution of the conversion right at a time when the market price of the underlying
security was above the conversion price was simply an alternative to redemption as a
means of forcing conversion. The only trouble with these arguments, which to my mind
are the most cogent criticisms of the market price formula, is that they prove too much.
To the extent that they are valid in respect to sales of additional shares to the shareholders at bargain prices, they are also valid as to stock dividends or any other gratuitous
distributions. The only answer is that the convertible security holders should not be
coerced into surrendering either their preferred position or a portion of their "accrued
gain" unless the corporation is prepared to take the forthright step of calling the convertible securities for redemption.
21 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 24 n.32.
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the market is at its low point, the conversion price formula may be
a better bet for the security holder. Any assumptions of this kind are
of course extremely speculative, but they represent a more analytical
approach than the choice of a "traditional" formula which promises
"windfalls."
Bargaining considerations aside, I suggest that the market price
formula should be the normal starting point in the preparation of
anti-dilution provisions. It is much easier to understand and much
easier to justify to an issuer or purchaser unfamiliar with the esoterica
of convertible securities than any version of the competing conversion
price formula. And I do not think the problems attributed to it are
really that serious.
One final thought. Professor Kaplan takes comfort in the fact that
the final draft of the model debenture indenture prepared by the
American Bar Foundation contains no "boilerplate" anti-dilution
clause, since "it is apparent that anti-dilution clauses should be classified as negotiable." 22 But to say that there may be important and negotiable differences between the market and conversion price formulas
is not to conclude that models of the different basic formulas would
not be helpful. Drafting anti-dilution provisions from scratch is a
time-consuming proposition, and the risk of serious gaps in protection
from inadequate drafting or the choice of an inappropriate precedent
is substantially greater than any dangers involved in choosing among
23
the recognized formulas.
Id. at 30 n.39.
A "Commentaries Committee" of the group which prepared the model debenture
indenture "has now enlisted the aid of thirteen nationally-known experts to prepare
practical articles explaining and analyzing each negotiable provision and presenting
samples of how they are handled in actual transactions." Rodgers, The Corporate Trust
Indenture Project, 20 Bus. LAw. 551, 569 (1965).
22
23

